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Introduction
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has been under fire since its creation in 1958 at the Stresa conference and its introduction in the 1960s. Nevertheless, it has long been considered by foes, rightly or wrongly, as a policy impossible to reform substantially, because of staunch opposition to reform from powerful farm and agribusiness lobbies and because of the complications of European politics.
In 1995 Austria joined the European Union and Franz Fischler, a then largely unknown Austrian politician, became EU Commissioner in charge of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). There was surprise that a new member state had been given the powerful Agricultural Commission chair, but no major expectations surrounded his arrival in Brussels. However, a decade and two tenures later, Fischler left behind a CAP that was dramatically changed from the one he inherited and he is recognised by friend and foe as the architect of the most radical reforms of the CAP. The paper is related to studies on the political economy of the CAP, such as Ackrill (2000), Grant (2000) , Josling (2008) , Moyer and Josling (2002) , Olper (1998) , Pappi and Henning (1999) , Ritson and Harvey (1997) , and others; and to analyses of agricultural policy reforms in other countries, such as Gardner (2002) and Orden et al (1999 Orden et al ( , 2008 .
The analysis in the paper draws on a combination of insights from recent studies, interviews with experts and those involved in the decision-making, and of analytical work by the author.
The paper is organised as follows. It first briefly summarizes the key elements of the
Fischler reforms and then discussed what made the Fischler reforms radical -and what not. Then
a conceptual framework is presented, which is used to interpret how various factors affected the political outcome. In the next sections, these influencing factors are discussed in greater (empirical) detail. The final section concludes.
The reforms
There were several reforms prepared and implemented over the two terms that Franz
Fischler was Commissioner for Agriculture and Rural Development of the EU, which spanned almost a decade . Some of the reforms, such as the Agenda 2000 package, were very important. Still, his name is most closely associated with the reform of 2003, which at the time was generally referred to as the 'mid-term review' (MTR), a term that in hindsight does not do justice to the extent and substance of the reform package that was decided in 2003. These reforms are assessed by many experts as the most radical reforms of the CAP since its creation.
The essence of the reforms is well summarised in various publications, including those by the European Commission. The 2003 reforms contain the following main elements. 1 First, the key innovation of the reforms was the introduction of the single farm payment (SFP) on the basis of historical entitlements (although with some flexibility of application), decoupling a large share of CAP support from production. Second, two new instruments, 'cross-compliance' and 'modulation', were introduced. Cross-compliance requirements ensure that the SFP is only paid to farmers who abide by a series of regulations relating to the environment, animal welfare, plant protection and food safety. Modulation refers to the shift of funds to rural development policies (i.e. from pillar I to pillar II) by reducing transfers to the larger farms. Third, the reforms introduced changes in several market organisations, especially in the dairy and rice sectors, by 1 See Tables A1-A3 in appendix for more details.
increasing dairy quotas and reducing rice support prices, replacing them with direct support to be integrated in the SFP.
Yet the 2003 MTR cannot be seen in isolation from other reforms and policy decisions.
This point not only relates to Agenda 2000, but also to several decisions on the EU budget of which the CAP budget takes a very large share -and is thus a major aspect in the negotiations for the budget decisions. Such an outcome is hard to assess as a 'reform' of the CAP -rather quite the contrary. we discuss further.
Were the 2003 reforms radical reforms?
Several experts define the 2003 reforms as the most radical reforms since the beginning of the CAP (see e.g. Pirzio-Biroli (2008) and Olper (2008) ). This assessment primarily refers to the content of the MTR but to some extent also refers to the timing and the approach of the reforms.
There is a general consensus that the decision to decouple farm support from production was a very radical change in the CAP. In addition, the policy shift from quantity and the public regulation of markets and prices to a policy focused on quality, market-based initiatives and rural development is also an important and in some sense dramatic change from a strategic view of what the CAP should accomplish. Some of these elements, in particular that of rural development, had already been initiated in Agenda 2000.
Yet, there are also significant elements of the 2003 reforms that were decidedly less than 'radical'. Some of these arose from the political compromises that were needed to get the overall reforms through -they were, one might say, aspects of the 'reform package'. The modesty of other achievements can be attributed to other reasons. First, a key fact is that total farm support has only marginally been affected by the reforms and remains essentially the same as before.
Moreover, there is very little change in the distribution of CAP benefits across countries and farms. Second the reforms had no effect on EU border protection (except for the rice sector (Olper (2008) ). While this fact is less discussed, it remains a very important one, in particular in the perspective of the Doha round and in view of the claims that the CAP is now much less market distortive. Third, the much emphasised shift to a rural development policy should be judged not just on the base of the wording but also on the base of the funding reallocation between pillar I and pillar II. Judging on these bases, the reforms are much more modest than the official statements. Moreover, during the budgetary negotiations following the Fischler reforms, when it was necessary to cut some of the CAP budget, it was the budget for pillar II that was reduced, not that of pillar I payments. In fact, it is a remarkable observation that, despite all of Fischler's emphasis on rural development, the budget for pillar II was lower at the end of his tenure than it was before the 2003 MTR. Fourth, a considerable compromise came by giving in to British demands to discard the ceiling on payments to farms -which would disproportionately affect the UK with its large farms and landowners. Another compromise came by giving in to German demands to implement the decoupled payments on a regional basis instead of on a historical basis.
An aspect of the MTR that is a notable change from the past is the decision to anticipate rather than react to problems stemming from external changes. In the past CAP reforms were always in reaction to problems -such as market surplus and burgeoning public stocks (e.g. the introduction of dairy and sugar quotas in the 1980s) or trade conflicts (e.g. the MacSharry reforms in the 1990s) (Josling, 2008a) . In contrast, the MTR and Agenda 2000 were reforms that to a considerable extent anticipated necessary changes. This was an important change.
Possibly the most radical features of the reforms were their timing and the audacity of the Brenton & Núñez Ferrer, 2000; Núñez Ferrer & Emerson, 2000; Buckwell & Tangermann, 1999; Burrell 2000 
Conceptual framework
What made these radical reforms possible? To explain this, I make use of a conceptual framework drawing on the theoretical research on EU decision-making (e.g. Crombez (1996 Crombez ( , 2000 , Steunenberg (1994) , Tsebelis (1994) ) which has been applied to CAP decision-making by Henning and Latacz-Lohmann (2004) and Pokrivcak, Crombez and Swinnen (2006) . Pokrivcak, Crombez and Swinnen (2006) develop a theory of CAP reform and identify the conditions which create, what they refer to as, "the optimal reform context". According to this theory, CAP reform is more likely when (a) an external change that moves policy preferences in a pro-reform direction, (b) this external change is large, (c) the policy preferences of the EU Commission are pro-reform, and (d) the EU voting rules require a lower majority.
The intuition is the following. Ceteris paribus, an external change that alters the political preferences of the member states will lead to a demand for policy adjustments. Still, effective policy adjustments will only occur if the change is large enough, because of the decision-making procedures in the EU that induce a 'status quo bias'. If the external change is sufficiently large, the final outcome will depend on the preferences of the Commission -which sets the agenda. The
Commission can make a proposal within a certain policy range, which will ultimately be approved. Hence, if the Commission has strong pro-reform preferences, it can pick the strongest reform option that is possible within the policy range that can be approved.
The extent (or size) of the external change that is required for change, and thus the likelihood of reform for a given change, is directly related to the voting rules. Under the unanimity rule, those most opposed to reform hold an as-if veto over the reform decision. Under simple majority rule, any change that affects the preference of the median (country) voter will lead to a reform. Under a qualified majority rule, an external change needs to be sufficiently large for a minimum coalition of countries (those required to form a qualified majority) to be better off with a policy change than with current policies.
The final outcome will also depend on the number of decision-makers and their preferences, and on the "quality" of decision-makers agents and agenda-setters. First, differences in quality of the political agents, for example due to experience or to political capital of various agents, may obviously also play a role. Second, the number of decision-makers (and with it the distribution of preferences) has not stayed constant over the years. In particular, consecutive enlargements of the EU have affected the number of member states, and with it the heterogeneity of preferences of member state governments (Henning and Latacz-Lohmann, 2004 ).
In the rest of the paper I will use this framework to show that radical CAP reform was possible in 2003 because several factors which in combination contribute to "an optimal reform context" -or "the perfect storm" -were all present at the time of the decision-making, and in the period leading up to it. More specifically, these factors included important external changes that caused a strong pressure for reform, a Commissioner who wanted (a particular kind of) substantive reforms, institutional EU reforms allowing qualified majority on major CAP reforms, enlargements affecting the voting balance, an experienced Commissioner turning out to be a great political strategist and tactician, and a series of exceptional circumstances affecting the ultimate coalition formation.
In the next sections, I first discuss empirical evidence on each of these factors, including external changes, institutional reforms, changes in the agents involved, reform preferences, the experience of the Commission, the political coalitions, etc. We then use this evidence to analyse to the extent to which these conditions have affected the Fischler reforms. We start with the external changes.
External changes and pressures for CAP reform
There is an extensive literature documenting that changes in external factors, such as world market prices and exchange rates, affected the level of agricultural protection in the EU or CAP reform (e.g. Olper, 1998 Olper, , 2008 . Josling (2008a,b) CAP world). There was uncertainty due to uncertainty about the evolution of CEEC productivity, world markets and exchange rates (Swinnen 2001 (Swinnen , 2002 . 4 Still, the likelihood of a WTO conflict was expected to depend more on the outcome of the upcoming negotiations in the WTO millennium round than on the post-Agenda 2000 enlargement effects. If, as a result of a new WTO agreement, the EU needed to significantly reduce export subsidies or change the implementation of the direct payments, the CAP would have to be reformed, irrespective of enlargement.
Although no one expected the next round on agriculture to be easy, in the late 1990s it looked as if it could be a rather straightforward exercise, at least in concept. The previous round had resulted, if not in much effective liberalisation, at least in a framework to build on in the next round. Specifically, three major areas of negotiation had been identified and measures of progress had been agreed upon and used in the negotiations (indicators on 'market access', 'aggregate measure of support' and volumes and total amount of export subsidies). An optimistic negotiation scenario was that negotiators would merely focus on these areas and negotiate further reductions in these indicators.
By 2000, however, it had become clear that this was too optimistic. The growing discontent of the developing countries with the WTO introduced them as a major and new factor in the negotiations. Not only did this complicate the negotiations, it also brought much uncertainty.
Other trade negotiations
The WTO was not the only trade arrangement affecting EU agricultural and food markets and the CAP. Pascal Lamy, while still Commissioner for Trade, undertook several trade initiatives to stimulate both multilateral and regional trading agreements. Among the latter were initiatives for liberalising trade between the EU and Mercosur. Another Lamy initiative, the Everything but Arms (EBA) trade proposal, was to allow all imports of the 48 poorest countries without restrictions into the EU market. The EBA proposal was heavily opposed by interest groups from the rice, sugar and banana sectors. These lobby efforts delayed the implementation of the EBA proposal, but the EBA agreement had considerable implications for some sectors, such as sugar, and further raised awareness of the international effects of the CAP and contributed to the sense of a need to reform the CAP.
Food safety and environmental concerns
With rising incomes, consumer demands for food quality and safety had increased. This general trend was reinforced by several food safety crises in the years before the MTR. These crises put food safety, animal welfare and environmental concerns on top of the agricultural policy agenda. Both the BSE crisis and foot and mouth disease (FMD), which started in the UK and spread to other countries afterwards, and the dioxin crisis, which started in Belgium, had EUwide effects through trade restrictions imposed by other countries. Probably even more importantly, extensive media coverage provoked strong public reactions.
The strong reactions of consumers and the general public on this issue contrasted sharply with their rather passive attitude vis-à-vis traditional agricultural policy issues in the past decades.
Following these crises, there were strident calls for the overhaul of the EU's agricultural policy.
Consumer groups, environmental organisations and government officials emphasised that large government subsidies for farming practices that did not adhere to appropriate food safety, environmental and animal welfare standards were unacceptable.
There were considerable political impacts. In Germany, the minister of agriculture and the minister of health affairs had to resign in the wake of the discovery of BSE in the country. The Affairs, giving a clear signal of the change in policy priorities. In Belgium, two ministers, including the minister of agriculture, had to resign following the discovery of dioxin in the food chain and the dioxin scandal contributed to a major electoral defeat of the governing parties. The EU budget was also affected by significant additional expenditures because of both increased intervention purchases and additional policy measures to contain BSE and FMD. .
A loss of legitimacy and calls for reform
These various elements, some traditional and others new, combined to increase pressure for change of the CAP. Franz Fischler himself summarised these important developments as that the CAP had lost its legitimacy among the EU public. In particular, the fact that the CAP was increasingly seen as at the same time hurting EU trade interests, having negative effects on the environment and unable to address the food safety concerns of EU consumers was turning into a major call for reform.
These elements also affected the budgetary discussions taking place in around 2000. They compounded the call for radical changes in the CAP at a time when ministers of finance and other members of the European Commission, searching for budget cuts or reallocations within the EU budget, were already demanding significant budget cuts for the CAP. These were vital issues on the verge of eastern enlargement, a process that was expected to greatly increase the CAP budget if the CAP was not reformed to contain the costs and which entailed the need for extra budgetary means for the structural funds, with the new member states having much lower incomes than the EU-15 average. Hence, at the start of the Prodi Commission there was a view among many that the CAP budget should be cut, and a reduction target of 30% was mentioned. This view was reinforced by the Sapir report whic argued that EU expenditures on agriculture should be drastically reduced.
Institutional reforms and changes in voting rules
The voting rules had been altered by several institutional reforms of the EU prior to 2003, including the Single European Act (SEA) and the Treaties of Maastricht and Nice. Crombez (1996, 2000) analyzes the impact of these institutional changes on EU decision-making. Most relevant for our analysis are the changes in voting rules initiated by the SEA, as these introduced qualified majority voting in EU policy for decision-making where the unanimity rule had been used before.
In the 1990s, qualified majority voting was increasingly being used for minor CAP decisions but major CAP decisions were often still decided by unanimity. In this respect, the 1999 CAP reforms (Agenda 2000) were a watershed: for the first time a major country (France) was outvoted in relation to a major CAP reform.
For the MTR decision-making, this change in EU decision-making rule on agricultural policy played a very important role. As I will explain later, Fischler and his team spent a lot of effort trying to put together a winning coalition and breaking a blocking minority coalition.
Changes in the political actors
There were important changes, in who was involved in the decision-making and reform proposal preparations.
Enlargement
Two enlargement processes played a role: the previous enlargement of 1995 in terms of EU member state preferences, and the eastern enlargement in terms of an expected change in future preferences and more difficult decision-making.
First, the enlargement of the EU in the previous decades had affected both the aggregate preferences and the distribution of the votes in the EU. In particular, the accession of Sweden,
Finland and Austria to the EU in 1995 has been argued to affect the political equilibrium (Olper, 2008) . However, the effect on the CAP appears nuanced. While this enlargement certainly affected the camps of defenders and opponents of the CAP as it existed, it did not do so in a simple, linear way.
The pro-reform camp was reinforced with a vocal partner by the arrival of Sweden, which had gone through a process of radical liberalisation of its agricultural policy in the early 1990s, and which was forced to re-introduce government regulations and subsidies under the CAP with its accession to the EU. Sweden has consistently been a strong critic of the CAP and a voice for reform.
The two other countries however, Finland and Austria, had a protectionist agricultural stance before joining, as their small farms in disadvantaged areas depended on subsidies. After accession, they continued to support farm subsidies. However, as high-income countries with small-scale farmers, many based in mountainous or arctic regions, Finland and Austria were more sympathetic to supporting strategies for rural development, agri-environmental policies and multifunctionality of their rural areas, rather than large subsidies for quantity production -which mainly benefited the larger producers of the main crops.
Enlargement obviously reduced the share of votes of the established players in the EU, such as France and Germany. In addition, for cultural reasons, none of these three countries were 'natural allies' of France, a country that traditionally played a very important role in opposing CAP reforms.
Second, the anticipation of eastern enlargement played a role as well. With 10 Eastern
European countries joining, some of which have large agricultural sectors and an even larger farm population, the Commission realised that reform would not become easier after enlargement.
5 Therefore, the expected eastern enlargement gave a sense of urgency to the reform proposals: they had to be decided before eastern enlargement took place.
Commission preferences
A large share of the commissioners wanted reform of the CAP, although not all in the same direction. Commission President Romano Prodi and several of the other commissioners wanted the share of the CAP in the EU budget to be reduced, and substantially so. Commissioner for Trade Pascal Lamy wanted the CAP to be reformed in order to allow the EU to take the initiative in the Doha round and not always be on the defensive. In addition, the Commissioners were reflecting consumer and environmental concerns pressuring for change.
As Commissioner for Agriculture and Rural Development, Fischler was keen to leave a legacy in terms of having reformed the CAP towards a course that he considers sustainable and consistent with his view of European agriculture -an Austrian perspective one could argue. A CAP that is more in line with broad rural development, the environment, the production of quality and safe food, etc., differs from the "old CAP", which was focused on quantity, output and prices. 
Pressure groups
The 2003 MTR discussions and political tactics also transformed the politics-as-usual in the CAP. Traditionally, the main pressure group involved in the CAP negotiations had been the farm unions. They put pressure on their agriculture ministers and on the Commission and tried to obtain as much as the other ministers would allow. But the MTR negotiations brought consumer groups and environmental groups to the political table more forcefully than had happened before.
In fact, Fischler reached out purpose to these groups in selling his MTR proposals. He saw them as his main audience in re-establishing public support for a reformed CAP. He deliberately designed a media strategy and a series of presentations to communicate with these groups and to win their support for his reforms. His strategy was that, even in countries that were not in favour of CAP reforms per se, the public was still very much in favour of policies that improved the rural environment, enhanced animal welfare, ensured food safety and food security, etc.
The administration
Finally, an important potential source of opposition against the reforms was within the Commission itself: the traditional DG for Agriculture thinking of the administrators. The preparation of the reforms was kept within a tight circle of six top officials (of the cabinet and of the administration). A group of administrators concerned with policy analysis within the DG for Agriculture were asked to assess the effects of some of the proposals, but without being fully informed. Once the reform proposals were finalised, an essential mission was to convince the rest of the DG for Agriculture and Rural Development that this was the right strategy.
In this respect, a number of earlier institutional changes may have contributed as well. The administrative reforms introduced some years before in the European Commission removed the hold of France on the top job in the DG for Agriculture. In addition, many of the old-style DG for Agriculture officials, whose careers had developed in the early years of the CAP, had left and younger persons had joined in the past decade, such that thinking within the DG for Agriculture
was much more open to, for example, environmental and economic arguments (Moehler, 2008) .
A complex reform puzzle
It is clear from the discussion above that there were strong pressures to reform and that internal changes had enhanced the opportunity for reform. However, almost all the participants in the reform debate and most outside observers which I interviewed argue that the success of the reforms was far from certain at the outset. Most thought that the chances were slim ex ante. For example, Pirzio-Biroli (2008) claims that one of the most experienced experts on CAP reforms, the well-known former Commissioner for Agriculture Guy Legras, thought that Fischler would never succeed in getting his proposal approved. Another senior Commission official illustrated the general scepticism with the story that three months before the Fischler reforms were approved, the minister of agriculture of his home country bet him a bottle of champagne that the proposals would never make it through the political process.
Before going into the political tactics, I discuss first the complexity of the reforms. The reform process was very complex because of both the timing and the interaction, and sometimes contradiction, of the various elements.
Reform + reform = More or less reform?
The various demands for reform were not all consistent and in some sense appeared to weaken rather than reinforce one another. For example, the food safety crisis significantly contributed to the demand for reform of the CAP, and probably more than anything else put CAP reform on the political agenda and raised public awareness about agricultural policy. The interactions between environmental and food safety concerns and subsidies were especially strong in the livestock sector where BSE caused many problems, while at the same time CAP subsidies stimulated overproduction and exports were subsidised.
Yet, the reform ideas coming out of this agenda tended to go in the direction of more regulation rather than less, and of more subsidisation (albeit redirected) rather than less. For example, few of the environmental groups and parties who pressured for a radical rethinking of agricultural policy in the EU considered trade liberalisation and WTO negotiations a positive development. Their stance contrasted with the more traditional pressure for CAP reform mostly from economists and some politicians arguing for less regulation and lower subsidies, and favouring more liberalised trade and markets. For example, while 'old reformers' tended to look rather sceptically upon the concept of 'multifunctionality', which the EU was pushing in the WTO negotiations as an argument to maintain a large part of its agricultural support system, 'new reformers' tended to appreciate this concept as it is consistent with their desire to subsidise and protect a certain farming system and rural way of life.
In conclusion, the pressure to reform the CAP had clearly increased by 2001, but it did not contribute to a more focused picture on what direction the reforms would take. Clearly, there was reinforcement in the sense that 'something needs to be done', but there was much less common ground on what. In fact, some of the reform ideas pointed in opposing directions.
Nonetheless, in Fischler's mind (and his team) the various pressures were cristalyzing into a consistent reform strategy. In hindsight, it appears that the argument that the BSE crisis had nothing to do with agricultural policy (e.g. Tangermann, 2001 ) may have been true from an economic perspective, but not from a political one. In fact, in the type of political strategy that
Fischler and his team had in mind, they fitted very well together.
Timing: Finding the right reform moment
The timing was also complex. Several major developments, all of which affected each other, overlapped: the WTO negotiations, the enlargement negotiations, the enlargement process itself, the Agenda 2000 implementation, the mid-term reviews, elections in member states etc (see table 1 ). To see the complexity, we should put ourselves back in the situation in 2001. 
Preparation of the reforms
Fischler had learned from his own earlier reforms and from the experiences of earlier commissioners that if specific proposals come out early, vested interest groups, such as the commodity groups, will mobilise quickly and reform efforts may be undermined and blocked before they are even launched. Therefore, Fischler put together a small inner circle of six officials to prepare the entire reform package. As is well documented by Pirzio-Biroli (2008) and Syrrakos (2008), a small group of senior Commission officials, drawing on a substantial amount of study and analysis by experts within the Commission administration, were preparing the details of the proposals and calculating potential effects. The six were high-level Commission staff, partly from his cabinet and partly from the DG for Agriculture. Everybody else was kept in the dark or on a need-to-know basis. Commission services were asked to do preparatory analyses and impact studies without being informed of the entire picture. 7 There are some notable stories surrounding the secrecy of the reform preparations, including the distribution of proposals on specially marked paper. Syrrakos (2008) even refers to a break-in at the Commission offices.
It appears with hindsight that opponents, and in particular France, did not take Fischler's presentations and public expressions of his thoughts seriously, either because they underestimated his determination to see through these reforms or they overestimated their own political and diplomatic strength and capacity to block them (as discussed further below). In a personal interview, Fischler later confirmed that this was also roughly his interpretation of the facts.
A final element of Fischler's strategy was a communication plan to build support for the reforms from a non-traditional political coalition across the member states. Instead of focusing on the farm unions, Fischler went out of his way by giving presentations, interviews to the media and participating in conferences to secure support for his reforms from environmental organisations and consumer groups. When the reform proposals were announced, the traditional negative reactions emerged from farm unions. In the past they had dominated the political discussions on the CAP. Now other organisations, such as consumer groups and environmental organisations joined the debate and presented a different view. As a result, the discussions were more balanced than in previous reform efforts.
Getting the Commission to approve
Many commissioners in the Prodi Commission had demanded budget cuts for the CAP and substantial reforms. As Pirzio-Biroli (2008) 
Counting the votes: the role of the Iraq war
As explained earlier, qualified majority voting had become the rule for CAP reform decisions. When the MTR proposal was announced, only a few member states supported the proposal. The UK and Sweden, the member states customarily in favour of CAP reforms, immediately supported the proposal. Yet, most other member states were sceptical at best, pointing to specific problems, or they were clearly opposed to the reforms.
After some time, three groups emerged: the 'pro-reform group', which in addition to the UK and Sweden also included the Netherlands and Denmark; a 'middle group' that included Greece, Belgium, Luxembourg, Finland, Austria and Italy; and the 'anti-reform group' with France, Spain, Germany, Portugal and Ireland.
The middle group contained a set of countries that were not completely opposed but had specific problems with the reforms. Based on experience, the Commission thought it could win the support of most of the countries in this group since it was predominately made up of small countries, and by providing concessions in specific areas they could be convinced -or 'bought' in a more cynical perspective -to support the reforms. Another reason why the middle group was not considered a major problem was because it included Luxembourg, which has few votes, Greece, which held the presidency and wanted a successful conclusion and summit, and Belgium, which did not have a unified voice with three ministers of agriculture.
The anti-reform group was strong with three large countries (France, Spain and Germany) and it easily controlled a blocking minority. The anti-reform group was not a natural coalition, however. In particular, Germany played a special role. Since her appointment, Renate Künast, the politician from the Green Party who had been appointed the German minister responsible for the CAP, had been a vocal advocate of CAP reform towards a more environmentally friendly CAPand should have been a natural ally of Fischler. Although this was indeed the case initially, when the reform ideas were being discussed and during the early reform preparation, political alliances that were more influential later interfered with the Fischler reforms and with the Künast alliance in particular.
Traditionally, a joint Franco-German position on any issue was sufficient to make it a de facto EU decision. This political axis had continued to work very well under the regimes of Chancellor Helmut Kohl and President François Mitterrand. Although both had opposing political views (Kohl as a German Christian-Democrat and Mitterrand a French Socialist), they had managed to overcome their differences to form a very powerful and successful European force.
However, there was no chemistry between the new leaders of France and Germany. Gerhard
Schröder and Jacques Chirac disliked one another and did not manage to form a bond or a strong In the days following these political changes, Künast, who was herself in favour of the basic reform proposals, managed to re-take the initiative in Germany on the CAP reforms and to change the German stance in the reform debate. But, like Blair, she asked for adjustments of the reform proposals in exchange for her support. Künast liked the idea of cross-compliance, but wanted to implement the decoupled payments not based on what farms had received in the past (which became known as the 'historical model') but instead pay farms in the same region the same payment, independent of what they had received in the past (later termed the 'regional model').
Fischler opposed this idea, not so much for the economic effects, but rather for the political ones. He feared that the redistribution of subsidies among farms, which was implicit in the regional model, could increase the opposition to the CAP reforms on the part of farm interests.
Olper (2008) Nonetheless, Künast was adamant on this issue because she wanted to use the new subsidy system to support more extensive and organic farming systems, which traditionally had not been receiving as much support as the intensive, conventional production systems. 8 Fischler ultimately gave in to Künast's demands in order to obtain the German votes. In the final proposal, Germany was allowed to introduce the regional model. In fact, other countries also took the opportunity to use the regional model -and some other variations such as the hybrid model (Ciaian, Kancs and Swinnen, 2008) .
Finally, Ireland also switched positions, but for an entirely different reason. Irish farm unions strongly opposed the reforms. Farmers themselves, however, had a different perspective.
They were convinced that the reforms could be good for them as they provided them with direct income support and at the same time allowed them more freedom in their decisions. The Irish position switched, despite farm union opposition, as the Irish minister sided with the preferences of the grassroots farmers.
In the end, France found itself isolated in its opposition. And even within France, the opposition was no longer unanimous, even within the FNSEA -the main French farm union.
French grain farmers increasingly liked the idea fearing that the alternative would be worse, meaning possibly lower payments in the future. Apparently, Chirac, when confronted with some of the FNSEA leaders arguing in favour of the reforms, referred to this as the "Fischlerisation of
France". Facing a loss in qualified majority voting, France then tried to join the winning camp and to extract compensations and adjustments from the Commission reform proposals. But they were in a weak negotiating position and finally ended up with little. 
Getting the decision through the Council

Reduced influence of farm unions?
Arguably, the EU farm unions had less impact on both the debates and the outcomes of the 
The impact of economic arguments and analysis
In several of my interviews it was mentioned that a series of studies and analyses had a considerable impact on the CAP reform process.
First, Fischler himself referred to the importance of an OECD study on decoupling. In particular, the fact that the OECD study demonstrated that with a decoupled support system twice as much of it remains with the farmer ('ends up in the pocket of the farmer') than with the existing support system was a very influential idea. Fischler and his colleagues saw the salience of the argument not only from an economic perspective, but also and to an even greater degree from a political one. If the CAP was using half the EU budget, they considered it essential to convince the EU taxpayer that this money was well spent and was effectively used. The analysis by the OECD reinforced the argument in favour of decoupling.
In this respect, it is worth further analysing Fischler's motives to push for decoupling and compare these with those of economists who had long argued in favour of less distortionary instruments. Economists, based on their focus on efficiency and reducing distortions, had long preferred non-distortionary (lump sum) transfers, of which the type of decoupled payments that
Fischler proposed were a welcome improvement.
While the standard economic arguments were never convincing for Fischler, he came to similar conclusions in favour of decoupling from a more political reasoning. The assessment by many Commission officials involved was that because of the lack of preparation, the country positions were often inconsistent and the DG for Agriculture, which was much better prepared, was able to point out the inconsistencies and thereby weaken the opposition. The crucial point was that decoupling was a good reform, and their analysis showed it.
Franz Fischler: Killer or saviour of the CAP?
The previous discussion depicts the Fischler team at the Commission as one to introduce major changes to the CAP. The acrimonious reactions following the launch of the proposals involved accusations of the Commission siding with opponents who wanted to 'scrap the CAP'. From this viewpoint, it is interesting to note that according to Fischler himself, the concept of decoupling was not chosen for the reasons most often mentioned by economists, i.e. to reduce distortions (see above), but because it was the best thing to do to save the CAP. Commission to agree to a much smaller budget cut than they had asked for.
Fischler argues that Prodi himself (and with him many commissioners and ministers of finance) had targeted a 30% budget cut of the CAP when the Prodi Commission took office. By proposing a series of bold reforms that reduce the negative effects of the CAP on the environment, on market distortions and on the WTO negotiations, and that enable the CAP to fit within a concept of sustainable rural development, Fischler and his team would in turn reduce the ammunition of those demanding large budget cuts and create a new support base for the CAP.
Only in this way was he able to convince the Commission to table a proposal (which was later approved) with much more limited cuts for the next financial period (i.e. up to 2013). Fischler saw 13 Notice, of course, that both perspectives are closely related. Transfer efficiency is high, exactly because distortions are low; also, the WTO may allow decoupled payments precisely because they do not (or minimally) distort international markets and trade.
this as a major achievement of the reforms. From this perspective, they 'saved the CAP' as opposed to scrapping it.
Conclusions
The 2003 MTR under Commissioner Franz Fischler was the most radical reform in the history of the CAP, albeit that some aspects of the reform package represent quite limited (or no)
reforms. The reform puzzle was complex, as was the timing. Several major developments, all of which affected each other, overlapped: WTO negotiations, enlargement negotiations, the enlargement process, the Agenda 2000 implementation, budget discussions and the mid-term reviews.
From the analysis in this paper we conclude that three (sets of) factors came together in the period around 2002. They created the 'perfect storm' which create a strong demand for radical CAP reforms and sufficient pressure to overcome opposition to such reforms. The three factors were, first, the effect of institutional reforms; second, changes in the number and quality of the political actors, and, third, the optimal conditions for reform within a given institutional framework.
In the years before the reform, there was strong pressure to reform because of external and internal factors. The main pressures were the WTO and other trade negotiations, the budget, food safety and environmental concerns and to a lesser extent enlargement. These elements, some traditional and others new, combined to increase pressure for change. Franz Fischler himself summarised these developments as that the CAP had lost its legitimacy among the EU public. The fact that the CAP was increasingly seen as at the same time hurting EU trade interests, having negative effects on the environment and unable to address food safety concerns of EU consumers was turning into a major call for reform. These developments compounded calls for radical changes to the CAP at a time when ministers of finance and other members of the European Commission were searching for budget cuts or reallocations within the EU budget.
The most critical institutional change was the Single European Act, which introduced qualified majority voting for CAP decision-making where the unanimity rule had been used before. The agents involved in the agenda-setting and decision-making had also changed. The opposition to reform by the farm unions was less successful than in previous CAP decisions. Farm unions were taken by surprise by the Fischler proposals and were unprepared.
They also faced a new political environment in which environmental and consumer groups were taken seriously by political leaders. However, decoupled payments are more effective in transferring income to farmers, and farmers may ultimately have realised this, which could contribute to explain their limited opposition.
Finally, Fischler and his team saw their reforms not as an instrument to reduce the importance of the CAP, but as a way of saving it. Bold reforms to reduce its negative effects on the environment, on market distortions and on the WTO negotiations, and to make it consistent with sustainable rural development, reduced the pressure for large budget cuts and created a new support base for the CAP. In this way major budget cuts for the next financial period were avoided. Fischler saw this as a major achievement of the reforms. From this perspective, the
Fischler reforms contributed to the survival of the CAP, rather than to its demise. Reductions are to be made in market support prices of 15% for cereals, 15% for milk and milk products from 2005 and 20% for beef and veal. The reduction in institutional prices will be phased in gradually and the lower prices will be partly offset by an increase in direct aid payments. Direct payments in the beef and dairy sectors will be paid to member states in the form of national financial allocations.
APPENDIX
Environmental
Two pillars are introduced to the CAP: market and income policy ('first pillar'), and the sustainable development of rural areas ('second pillar'). Agri-environmental measures are the compulsory component of the member states' rural development programmes. The principle of cross-compliance is introduced: the optional use of reductions of the direct payments for enforcing statutory environmental legislation and the so-called 'specific environmental requirement'. Cross-compliance is compulsory under the Disadvantaged Area Scheme.
Enlargement
Under the SAPARD scheme, €520 million per year is set aside for structural and rural development programmes. Priorities include investing in farms, developing processing and marketing structures, improving veterinary and plant health controls, and encouraging economic diversification in rural areas.
Modulation
Optional modulation of the direct payments is made to farmers under the CAP based on criteria that can include the workforce on the holding, the overall prosperity of the holding or the total amounts of payments granted under support schemes (up to 20% of the direct payments); the money remains in the member state to be spent on accompanying measures.
Financial
For the period 2000-06, the Council decided on a financial framework of an average level of €40.5 billion plus €14 billion over the period 2000-06 for rural development as well as veterinary and plant health measures. Finally, each year €520 million is made available for the SAPARD programme. Market support Revisions made to the market policy of the CAP include • asymmetric price cuts in the milk sector -the intervention price for butter will be reduced by 25% over four years, which is an additional price cut of 10% compared with Agenda 2000; for skimmed milk powder, a 15% reduction over three years (as agreed in Agenda 2000) is retained; • reduction of the monthly increments in the cereals sector by half, while the current intervention price will be maintained; and • reforms in the rice, durum wheat, nuts, starch potatoes and dried fodder sectors.
Environmental
Decoupled payments are linked to the respect of environmental, food safety, animal and plant health and animal welfare standards, as well as the requirement to keep all farmland in good agricultural and environmental condition (cross-compliance). Rural development policy is strengthened with more EU money and with new measures to promote the environment, quality and animal welfare and to help farmers to meet EU production standards starting in 2005.
Modulation Direct payments are reduced (modulation) for the larger farms (direct payments > €5,000) to finance the new rural development policy: by 3% in 2005, by 4% in 2006 and remaining at 5% from 2007 onwards.
Farm advisory system Advice on farm management processes, notably in relation to the environment, food safety and animal welfare, is available for farmers on a voluntary basis; in 2010 the European Commission will decide whether it will be made compulsory.
Financial
A mechanism is created for financial discipline to ensure that the farm budget fixed until 2013 is not overshot: direct aid will be adjusted when forecasts indicate that spending in the relevant areas of the CAP (market expenditure and direct payments) will exceed established ceilings, reduced by a safety margin of €300 million. 
